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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~IETROPOLITAN INVESTMENT

I

COMPANY, a Partnership composed
of W. ADRIAN WRIGHT, W.
~lEEKS WIRTHLIN, and A. P.
NEILSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent~\\ Ca;:
vs.

2~o.

JERRY SINE and DORA T. SINE,
his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
COMES NOW METROPOLITAN INVEST~IEN'l' COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent herein, and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for
a rehearing in the above .. entitled case, and to vacate the
Order of this. Court herein reversing the judgment for
Respondent with instructions to the trial court to write
findings in accordance with the opinion of this Honorable Court.
1
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This ·Petition is based on the following grounds:
POINT I
THIS COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THIS TO BE A CASE IN EQUITY
AND THAT TI-IE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THIS COURT ERRORED IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT THE FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND ADEQUATE EVIDENCE.
BRANT H. WALL and JACKSON B. HOWARD
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
POINT I
THIS COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THIS TO BE A CASE IN EQUITY
AND THAT THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY CLEAR
AND CON,TINCING EVIDENCE.
2-.
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The opinion rendered by this Court is predicated
upon the following statement in its decision:
"'rhe facts which the trial court found in support of the nullification of the restrictive covenant are facts which require clear and convincing
eYidence to support such findings.l This is an
equity case in which we review the trial court's
findings of fact but overturn them only where
it is Inanifest that the trial court has misapplied
proven facts or made findings clearly against the
weight of the evidence. "2
1. See Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981.
2. See Constitution of Utah Article VIII, Sec. 9; O'Gara v. Findlay,
6 Utah 2d 102, 306 P.2d 1073."

We believe this statement and rule to be contra
to the established law and prior holdings of this Court,
as the rule heretofore established and announced by
this Court is that an action to quiet title is an action at
law and is not an action in equity and hence the scope
of review is limited. In support of this proposal and
rule, we cite the following:
In Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P.2d
862, this Court held:

" * * * It is clear from the pleadings in this
case that the action is one at law and therefore
that a jury trial should have been granted. Bolognese Y. Anderson, Utah, 90 P .2d 27 5. See
also Nor back Y. Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506,
37 p .2d 339."
The above case was cited with approval in Dahnken
Y. George Romney & Sons Co., Ill Utah 471, 184 P.2d
211.

3
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In Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277,
in an action by the Plaintiff to quiet title to a driveway
in herself, the Defendant claimed that the driveway
was appurtenant to his land and claimed to own it, this
Court held:
"Under the criteria set out in Norback v.
Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 P .2d 339,
this action is one at law. Hence, if there is any
competent evidence in the record to support the
court's findings, the judgment should not be disturbed. Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah
475, 290 Pac. 759; Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah
307, 231 P. 112. This principle is well stated in
Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070,
1072: 'As this is a law action, the question is not
whether the evidence would have supported the
decision in favor of the appellants, but whether
the decision made by the trial court finds support
in the evidence. If there is competent credible
evidence to support the findings made by the
trial court, then those findings should stand.' "
In Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250,
this Court cited the case of Babcock v. Dangerfield,
supra, for the holding that an action to quiet title is
an action at law, and made the following discussion on
page 252 Pac. 2d.:

"'iV e are further of the opinion that although
historically an action to quiet title was originally
equitable and the law courts had no jurisdiction
to grant such relief, that situation does not prevail in this state. Formerly the equity courts
afforded relief because there was no adequate
remedy at law. In this jurisdiction, however,
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there is an adequate remedy provided by statute
under the provisions of Chapter 40 of Title 78,
C .C ..A. 1953. Likewise in this state the distinctions between law and equity actions have been
abolished by Article 'rill, Section 19 of the
Constitution of Utah."
And

011

Page 253 P. 2d:

"In the case of Buckley v. Cox,3 Plaintiff
brought an action to quiet title in a driveway in
herself and to enjoin the Defendants from further use of the same. This court speaking through
~Ir. Justice McDonough in an unanimous opinion held that the action was one at law."
The case before this Court involves an action to
quiet title to a parcel of real property and the pleadings
by the Plaintiff follow the provisions of 78-40-1, etc.,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Both parties have treated
and recognized this as such an action, but in many
instances have cited to this Court decisions from other
jurisdictions, wherein the action is considered to be one
in equity and hence certain equitable principles have
been cited to the Honorable Court. However, the decision by this Court completely reverses the above cited
Utah cases without referring to the decisions or recognizing their effect and weight.
\Ye readily concede that the requirement of proof
by "clear and convincing evidence" as announced in
the decision of this Court is well settled and recognized
in this jurisdiction in actions involving suits to cancel
or reform a written instrument or actions founded upon
fraud, deceit or mistake, and in support of this we cite

5
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the following cases: See Child v. Child, 8 Utah 261,
332 P.2d 981; Gray v. Gray, 108 Utah 390, 160 P.2d
432, and Hansen v. Mutual Finance Corporation, 84
Utah 579, 37 P.2d 782.
We respectfully wish to emphasize and point out
to this Court that the matter now submitted for review
does not involve any of the foregoing issues and therefore the rule announced requiring that the proof and
evidence be sustained by clear and convincing evidence
should not be the rule or the degree of evidence in actions
such as the one now before this Court. We submit that
there is no evidence in the record or allegation of fraud,
1nistake, deceit nor of attempt to cancel or reform any
written instrument. The restrictive covenant, as imposed and dictated by the Appellants, constituted a
cloud upon the title of the subject property and the
only issue for the trier of facts was to determine the
validity of same. 'Ve respectfully submit that the evidence is sufficient under applicable rules of evidence
to sustain the findings and judgment that appellants
have no right, title or interest in and to the subject
property. We cite for th~ consideraion of this Honorable Court in support of the foregoing the following:
In Buckley v. Cox, this Court held:
"The evidence as revealed by the record is conflicting. It is sufficient to support a decision for
either party. The trial judge saw and heard all
the witnesses and viewed the exhibits. He found
that the use by Defendant was per1nissive and
not adverse. Since competent evidence in the

6
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record supports the court's findings and judgrnent, we rnay not disturb the latter. See cases
supra."
In Green v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of
the United States, 3 Utah 2d 375, 284 P.2d 695, this
Court 1nade the following determination:
"This being a law action the question is not
whether the evidence would have supported a
judgment in favor of Appellant but whether the
judgment entered by the trial court finds support in the evidence."

':Ve therefore respecefully submit that the

decision
should be reviewed in the light of the prior holdings
of this Court and that the proper consideration be given
to the weight of the evidence and the matters which are
reviewable by the appellate court.

POINT II
THIS COURT ERRORED IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT THE ~-,INDINGS AND
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND ADEQUATE EVIDENCE.
A. There is adequate evidence in the record that
there has been a substantial change in the neighborhood
and that the change which has occurred is such as to
vitiate and render ineffective the restrictive covenant
involved in this action.

7
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At the time the restriction in question was imposed
in 1956, it is recognized by all parties to this action that
the area was composed of a few motels, sub-standard
housing, and some commercial business, but from that
date to the date of trial, a large number of motels has
been constructed along the street (R. 27, 28, 29; 30, 21,
102, 107). The Appellants now concede and admit the
change in the neighborhood and endeavor to justify
their position by stating that the development and
change in the neighborhood is nothing more than the
change and development that was contemplated by
the parties, that such change was already in progress
in 1956, and that the street along which the subject
property is located is now described as "motel row."
We are therefore confronted with an issue of fact relative to change in neighborhood which was submitted
to the trier of facts and after due consideration and
weighing of the evidence and testimony, the trial court
made findings in support of the Respondent's position,
which findings we believe are supported by adequate
and competent evidence.
B. The purposes and objects of the restrictive
covenant herein involved have been nullified and defeated.
We quote fron1 the Appellants' Brief on pages 3
and 4 as to the purpose for which the restrictive covenant was imposed:
"Mr. Jerry Sine was cognizant of the fact that
A. P. Neilson was interested in motel properties,

8
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and he was not willing to sell the subject property to anyone who intended to use it in conjunction with other properties to construct a large
motel. llis motive for preventing a motel from
being constructed on the subject property was
to protect his motel business conducted as Se
llancho and Scotty's Romney. * * * If a large
n1otel was erected, in part, on the subject property, Appellant feared that the business of Se
Rancho and Scotty's Romney would be adversely affected. Guests, especially those traveling
from the North and South and turning onto
North Temple Street, would be diverted into
such motel to the detriment of Se Rancho and
Scotty's Romney situated to the West thereof.
(R. 5, 52, 68, 79, 90, 99, 100) ."
"\tVe quote from the Letter submitted by counsel for
Appellants dated October 10, 1962, to the Honorable
Judges of the Supre1ne Court. On page 3 thereof the
following is stated:

" * * * It is true that the Appellant testified
that whether or not the six units which could be
built on this particular property were built would
not be substantial (R. 6). But there is no evidence that that was ever within the contemplation of the Appellants. The reason for the restriction, as testified by Mr. Sine, was that an
i1npressiYe front along North Temple Street
could not be built without this property, which
would be a substantial thing, and he also testified
that this would have a substantial effect upon
his business" (R. 91, 100, and 105; see also R.
40).

We submit that the language of the Appellants
as cited above clearly demonstrates that the sole pur9
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pose for the restrictive covenant was to prevent the
construction of a large motel on North Temple Street
between 2nd and 3rd West which might compete with
the business properties of the Appellants. The purpose
and object of the restrictive covenant was obviously
not to prevent the construction of the motel upon the
small parcel of land involved in this action, which A ppellants readily admit could not be utilized for motel
purposes of any consequence or which would interfere
with the Appellants' business endeavors. The cardinal
fact which must be recognized by this Court is that a
large and impressive motel is to be constructed upon
the properties surrounding the subject property notwithstanding the outcome of this litigation (R. 96 and
Exhibit 9). We submit that the Appellants have admitted on page 14 of Itheir Brief that the surrounding
property could be used for a large and impressive motel
development even without the use of the subject property. Appellants' obvious purpose and object was to
prevent the construction of a large and impressive
motel on the surrounding land which they did not own
nor have any right to control, and consequently, with
the construction of the motel by Western Travel, Inc.,
of approximately 130 units, there appears to be no
valid or subsisting reason to continue the existing restriction because it no longer has any usefulness nor
is it capable of serving the purpose for which it was
intended. Since the area has changed from sub-standard
housing and light commercial district to a street now
described as "motel row," and the change has in effect

10
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rendered the restriction of no value to the Appellants,
the findings of the trial court were entirely consistent
with and supported by the evidence and did not constitute any abuse of discretion or misapplication of the
evidence, or the law.
C. The trial court found that for the reasons hereinabove stated, the restrictive covenant would not confer any benefit upon the Appellants but would constitute only a detriment to the Respondent and hence
deter1nined that the restrictive covenant should be given
no further force and effect. In the decision rendered by
this Honorable Court, it is there stated as the wellrecognized rule of law that:
"We agree that there is no reason for continuing the restriction unless there is a benefit to be
realized by the Defendants. Restrictive covenants will not be enforced where enforcement is
no longer of general usefulness, nor capable of
serving purpose for which restriction was imposed, 6 or reason of restriction has ceased. "7
6. Osius et al, v. Barton, et al. (Florida, 1933) 147 So. 862.
7. See also Clark on Covenants and Interests Running With Land,
pp. 163-165. Dean Pound discussion on Covenants, 33 Harvard
Law Review, beginning at p. 171."

The Appellants failed to take an appeal from the
foregoing finding and the argument of "impressive
front" as advanced by them in their letter argument of
October 10, 1962, supra, which was filed after the oral
argu1nent in this matter and to which Respondent was
not given an opportunity to rebut, constitutes nothing
n1ore than a fanciful conclusion on the part of the

11
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Appellants. To say that an impressive front cannot
be constructed on North Temple Street without utilizing the subject property is clearly without support
and is refuted by the fact that Western Travel, Inc.,
contemplates the construction of a large motel along
said street with an impressive front whether the small
parcel of land, the subject of this litigation, is included
or not. We invite the Court's attention to the fact that
the improvements previously located upon the parcel
of land herein in question have been razed and that the
land is cleared (R. 31, 106, 107), and therefore to contend that there is any dimunition in the attractiveness
of the front is merely indulging in argument as to what
may appeal to the esthetic sense of different individuals
and in any event, is not manifest in the record by any
such clear and convincing evidence as would justify or
warrant overturning the finding of the trial court in
this regard. Hence, it can be argued and concluded
just as logically that the proposed new 1notel will be
designed with a front just as impressive with or without
utilizing the parcel of property herein involved as a
part of the area upon which the motel is to be constructed.
The testimony of the architect was to the effect that
the plans of the motel could be redesigned to delete
the construction of any 1notel units upon the subject
parcel of land but that it would present some proble1ns
with respect to re-aligning and re-routing underlying
water, sewer, and other utilities (R. 72, 73).

12
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\\' e respectfully submit that under any theory the
retention of the restrictive covenant will fail to confet·
any reasonable benefit upon the Appellants, that its
purpose and function has been completely thwarted
and ruled ineffective, that its retention will not preclude
the construction of the large motel development, nor
will it preclude the construction or design of an impressive front as suggested by this Court in its decision.
\Ye submit that the retention of the covenant will at
best constitute a harrassment and detriment to the
Respondent and confer no benefit upon Appellants as
found by the trial court.
D. This Court in its decision upsets the findings
of the lower court to the effect that the restrictive covenant was personal to A. P. Neilson and that it had
lapsed by the expiration of reasonable time.
The trial court heard the witnesses and had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness
stand. 'Vhere the evidence is conflicting, the appellate
court should affirm the findings of the trial court. In
such circumstances, the trial court is entirely justified
in disbelieving the testimony of the witness for the Appellants and giving credence to the testimony offered by
the witness for Respondent. The application of this
rule of law is elementary and requires no further discussion.
The sole issue before the Court as to the time that
the restriction is to continue is whether or not its purpose has been terminated by the Ia pse of reasonable

13
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time under the circumstances and facts of this case. The
Appellants contend that it has not lapsed and the
Respondent contends that it has, that its usefulness
has been lost for the reasons heretofore announced. We
believe that the findings of the trial court that the
change in the neighborhood and the purpose of the
covenant has been nullified was proper. The deterinination of this Court as to what is a reasonable time
for this restriction to remain in full force and effect
was not before the court for determination and should
not be considered by this Court.

SUMMARY
This Court's decision should be reviewed for the
purpose of determining whether or not this action
comes within the purview of the prior holdings of this
Court that actions to quiet title are to be considered as
actions at law and not actions in equity, and to clearly
establish whether or not this action falls within that line
of cases which requires the application of the rule of
evidence requiring that the findings be supported by
clear and convincing evidence.
We respectfully urge this Court to reconsider its
decision and afford counsel the opportunity of presenting these matters in oral argument. The error is too
obvious to permit of serious doubt. Respondent is
entitled to an affirmance of the decree and judgment
rendered by the trial court in this action.
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Respectfully subtnitted,
BRANT H. WALL
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
JACKSON B. HOWARD, for
HOWARD and LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
290 North University A venue
Provo, Utah
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